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Introduction 
 
 Several philosophers have argued that considerations of the evolution of human 
evaluative experience problematize versions of normative realism committed to the existence of 
normative truths that are independent of human evaluative attitudes (e.g., Fraser 2014; Joyce 
2006; Ruse 1986; Street 2006). These arguments purport to show that explanation of our 
evaluative experience does not require positing an irreducible normative reality, and so an 
acceptable account of the truth or justification of our normative beliefs cannot be construed along 
realist lines. While there has been no shortage of realist rejoinders to the epistemological 
elements of this challenge, an important dimension of the debate has been overlooked. Street 
(2006) claims that the normative realist cannot provide a scientifically acceptable account of the 
relation between, on the one hand, the evolutionary forces that shaped our evaluative attitudes 
and, on the other, the stance-independent normative facts the realist posits.1 Her unique scientific 
challenge couples the explanatory challenge typical of evolutionary debunking arguments with a 
specific set of scientific methodological criteria, which Street claims cannot be satisfied by 
normative realism. In this paper, I address this neglected aspect of Street’s argument.  
                                                
1 By stance-independent I mean independent of any hypothetical or actual psychological attitude. I adopt Street’s 
use of the term, which follows Shafer-Landau (2003). 
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I begin by clarifying Street’s argument and showing that her preferred evolutionary 
account of evaluative judgment, the Adaptive Link Account, fails to satisfy two of the three 
scientific criteria she employs in her critique of normative realism, namely clarity with respect to 
why these judgments were adaptive and illumination of the explanandum. I then argue that a 
byproduct view of evaluative judgment can serve as a plausible alternative to the adaptationist 
approach that dominates the evolutionary debunking literature. A byproduct view, I suggest, can 
be adopted by the realist as one way to meet the scientific challenge. Finally, I argue that, from a 
biological point of view, considerations of ontological parsimony, Street’s third criterion, do not 
weigh significantly against the conjunction of this byproduct account and normative realism. 
Before proceeding, I wish to register two caveats. First, I share Fraser’s (2014) concern 
that the debunking debates in ethics have largely neglected the scientific and empirical details 
pertinent to an inquiry into the evolutionary origins of evaluative judgment. Accordingly, much 
of my discussion involves foregrounding and clarifying the relevant scientific concepts and 
methods that typically receive little attention in these debates. This leads to a second caveat: I 
will not attempt to develop a substantive evolutionary account on the realist’s behalf. My more 
modest intention here is to outline and defend a plausible evolutionary perspective that is 
congenial to both nonreductive naturalist and nonnaturalist brands of normative realism. 
 
The Darwinian dilemma 
Street’s evolutionary argument against normative realism takes the form of a dilemma 
generated by the realist’s acceptance of the following hypothesis: 
EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS: Natural selection played a significant role in shaping 
our evaluative tendencies, thereby influencing the content of our most basic evaluative 
judgments. 
 
 3 
By evaluative tendency, Street means “an unreflective, non-linguistic, motivational tendency” to 
behave in a particular way (2006, 119). By our most basic evaluative judgments (hereafter ‘basic 
evaluative judgment’), Street denotes evaluative judgments that enjoy widespread affirmation 
across time and cultures and happen to be endorsements of evolved evaluative tendencies (ibid., 
115-117, 158n15).  
The realist needs to explain what, if any, relation obtained between selective pressures on 
evaluative judgment and the normative facts realism posits. Herein lies an alleged ‘Darwinian 
dilemma’ (DD). Suppose the realist were to deny a relation obtained between the two. This 
would lead to skeptical worries that selective pressures shaped evaluative judgments in ways 
quite unrelated to normative facts. Alternatively, the realist might contend that some relation 
obtained between the two. Street suggests that the most plausible way for the realist to construe 
this relation is as one of truth-tracking along the following lines: 
TRACKING ACCOUNT (TA): Human make certain basic evaluative judgments rather than 
others because these judgments are (i) true and (ii) making true evaluative judgments was 
adaptive for our ancestors. 
 
Street proposes her own Adaptive Link Account as a rival to TA: 
ADAPTIVE LINK ACCOUNT (ALA): Humans make certain basic evaluative judgments 
rather than others because these judgments forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ 
behavior and the environment(s) in which they lived. 
 
On ALA, some evaluative judgments enabled our ancestors to “act, feel, and believe in ways that 
turned out to be reproductively advantageous” (ibid., 127) such that tendencies to make these 
judgments were favored by selection.  
ALA, Street contends, is the superior explanation on three methodological criteria (ibid., 
129-34): (i) it is more illuminative of the explanandum; (ii) it provides a clearer answer to the 
question of why basic evaluative judgments were adaptive for our ancestors; and (iii) it is more 
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parsimonious insofar as it omits reference to independent normative facts. By these criteria, 
Street concludes, TA is “unacceptable on scientific grounds” (ibid., 109). Thus, by affirming a 
relation obtained between selection and normative facts, the normative realist faces what I am 
calling Street’s scientific challenge. 
How might the realist respond to the scientific challenge? In the next section, I argue that 
ALA fails to deliver the clear and illuminating explanation of our basic evaluative judgments 
promised by Street. From there, it remains for the realist to adopt a workable strategy for 
developing a plausible evolutionary account of evaluative judgment. I will outline and defend 
one such strategy in the sections that follow. 
 
Problems for ALA 
 
The central claim of ALA is that basic evaluative judgments are “deeply analogous” to 
hard-wired mechanisms we observe in other animals and plants, such as the Venus flytrap’s 
reflex mechanism for capturing prey or animal responses to pain stimuli (ibid., 127). According 
to Street, evaluative judgments play a functional role analogous to such mechanisms in that they 
forged an adaptive fit between organism and environment (ibid., 128). Just as selection favored 
and fixed certain traits in populations of plants and animals because these traits provided an 
adaptive advantage, selection favored certain kinds of basic evaluative judgments because they 
provided an adaptive advantage to those of our ancestors who tended to make them. Thus, ALA 
is clearly committed to an adaptationist view of basic evaluative judgments. While ALA might 
appear to provide a plausible explanation for basic evaluative judgments, closer scrutiny reveals 
the account to be implausible on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
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ALA is intuitively implausible 
One might initially wonder whether ALA aims to explain basic evaluative judgments 
themselves or the general tendency to make such judgments. Taking Street’s unpacking of ALA 
at face value, we can rule out the latter. This is because Street excludes from ALA’s purview the 
two candidate traits that ‘tendency’ might denote. On the one hand, one might think this 
tendency is explained in terms of the evaluative tendencies Street mentions. But ALA is an 
account of basic evaluative judgments, which are distinct from the phylogenetically ancient 
tendencies that may influence their content. ALA clearly ascribes an evolutionary function to 
basic evaluative judgments and omits any reference to the evolutionary function of the 
phylogenetically distinct evaluative tendencies. Moreover, evaluative tendencies do not 
themselves explain why humans make an additional judgment or endorsement of an evaluative 
tendency. On the other hand, one might think this tendency is some phylogenetically novel 
capacity for evaluative judgment. But Street expressly states that she does not intend ALA to be 
an explanation of the capacity to make evaluative judgments (ibid: 160n32). So, accepting ALA 
at face value, certain basic evaluative judgments are the adaptation to be explained. 
Now, adaptations are heritable traits that generated outcomes that contributed to the 
survival and reproductive success of individuals during the course of the evolutionary history of 
a population. In ascribing to basic evaluative judgments an evolutionary function, ALA 
characterizes evaluative judgment as one such process. Now consider that a trait is a biological 
adaptation only if it is heritable. This means that if basic evaluative judgments are adaptations 
(and therefore have evolutionary functions), as ALA holds, then basic evaluative judgments must 
be heritable. However, Street acknowledges that evaluative judgments are not heritable (ibid., 
 6 
118-119). But if no evaluative judgment is heritable, then basic evaluative judgments are not 
adaptations and do not, therefore, have an evolutionary function. This contradicts ALA. 
Suppose we were to try to diffuse this problem by noting that Street holds that selection 
only favored basic evaluative judgments indirectly. This won’t do. If evaluative judgments were 
indirectly selected for, then they do not, strictly speaking, have a biological function, since a 
biological function is the purpose for which a trait was (directly) favored by selection. If they do 
not have a biological function, then they are not an adaptation. Again, we reach a contradiction. 
Therefore, Street’s function analogy, which is the heart of ALA, does little to illuminate the 
evolutionary origins of basic evaluative judgments. 
Even if we were to modify ALA slightly by taking the explanandum to be the capacity to 
make basic evaluative judgments, difficulties persist. Street holds that the capacity for evaluative 
judgment was a “relatively late add evolutionary add on,” distinct from evolved evaluative 
tendencies already fixed in humans (ibid., 117). Like any evolutionary innovation in cognitive 
machinery, the capacity for evaluative judgment has biological maintenance cost, so if this 
specific capacity is an adaptation, it must have yielded a sufficiently high fitness payoff for 
individuals to offset that cost. With this in mind, perhaps considering an ideal case will help us 
determine whether this picture is clear. 
Imagine an ancestral hominid population P containing two subpopulations, one 
containing individuals who posses the capacity for making these evaluative judgments (S1) and 
the other containing individuals (S2) who do not. If ALA is correct, there must have been 
significant selective pressures in the direction of preserving the capacity for making these 
judgments such that S1 swamped S2, eventually wholly constituting P. Now, if the basic 
evaluative judgments S1 made were simply endorsements of evolved evaluative tendencies that 
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they share with S2, then there is a striking redundancy in S1’s evaluative system, since 
presumably behavioral outcomes connected with the making of evaluative judgments by S1 
would not vary much or at all with the behavior of S2. But a redundancy whose enabling 
mechanisms needlessly squander energy or resources is likely to be selected against. Moreover, 
consider Street’s observation that many of our evaluative judgments can “stray, perhaps quite 
far” from our inherited evaluative tendencies, and that our capacity for evaluative judgment 
includes the ability to “disavow” and “fight against” our evaluative tendencies (ibid., p. 120). 
Given that possibility, it is difficult to imagine that this capacity would have been more reliable 
at producing the same fitness-enhancing behaviors as the evolved evaluative tendencies if, in 
fact, basic evaluative judgments just are reflective endorsements of such tendencies. It seems, 
therefore, that the capacity to make evaluative judgments would not have been a cost-effective 
way of getting our ancestors to behave adaptively, assuming that the content of basic evaluative 
judgments is primarily determined by evolved evaluative tendencies. Street owes us, then, an 
account of how making these evaluative judgments contributed to the fitness of our ancestors 
over and above the evaluative tendencies that would have generated similar behavioral 
outcomes. 
One way Street might respond to this objection would to be argue that while evaluative 
judgments are not redundant mechanisms, they are functionally redundant to evaluative 
tendencies; perhaps evaluative judgments were selected for because they reinforce the behaviors 
for which our basic evaluative tendencies call. Perhaps increasingly complex social arrangements 
among our ancestors created more opportunities and temptation for individual defection, and 
basic evaluative judgments evolved to reinforce the kinds of cooperative behavior that secured 
fitness benefits for individuals, maybe even for the group. After all, a widely held view among 
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normative realists and anti-realists alike is that evaluative judgment provides some additional 
motivational push beyond mere evaluative or motivational tendencies. 
While this response might initially appear promising, it leaves too much unexplained. 
Simply pointing to the fact that evaluative judgment provides an additional push toward a certain 
kind of behavior only identifies a trait amenable to an evolutionary explanation. It does not 
explain why selection targeted judging that certain actions or states of affairs are ‘wrong’ or 
‘good’ was a more reliable way for motivating cooperative behavior than the deeply rooted 
tendencies selective forces had already shaped to produce similar adaptive behavior.2 Moreover, 
it is not clear why we should think evolutionary forces would fashion in our ancestors an 
additional, complex capacity for evaluative judgment rather than just tinker with those 
motivational and behavioral traits that were already fixed in individuals, including motivational 
tendencies to punish defectors, which we find present in other primates. This is precisely the 
explanation that an adaptationist account needs to provide, yet ALA fails to shed light on the 
matter.  
Consider what may be a more plausible evolutionary scenario: if evaluative tendencies 
became at some point in our evolutionary history unreliable for motivating cooperative behavior, 
either these tendencies would have been strengthened by further selective pressure or other fixed, 
                                                
2 Joyce argues that moral judgments express both a belief about a normative standard and a conative acceptance of 
that standard, the latter of which “denotes a motivation-implicating state” (2006, 109). Why is a mental state with 
propositional content needed in addition to a strong conative state to generate the requisite motivation for the 
adaptive behavior? Joyce suggests that Robin Dunbar’s grooming and gossip hypothesis provides a clue: language to 
facilitate social cohesion within increasingly large groups through the exchange of information about individual 
reputations. Joyce suggests that language would have been utilized not only to describe, say, failures of individuals 
to reciprocate helpful action, but to criticize those individuals. So language may have evolved to evaluate and keep 
score of others’ actions within large groups engaging in complex forms of exchange, much the same way as 
grooming facilitates social cohesion within small groups of nonhuman primates. While it is not possible to provide 
an assessment of Joyce’s account here, it is worth noting that Dunbar’s hypothesis has been challenged on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. For example, Bickerton (2009) and Barnard (2012) have argued that the 
grooming and gossip hypothesis does not explain the complexity of language and the conceptual sophistication 
required for it, and each contends that language evolved for purposes quite apart from social evaluation and 
cohesion. 
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co-present motivational tendencies would have sufficed or been strengthened by natural selection 
to reinforce that behavior. With respect to the latter possibility, one might think that mutualistic 
tendencies, which are widely shared by primates and have deeper phylogenetic roots than 
evaluative judgment, could have sustained cooperative interaction with non-kin within the small 
bands in which our ancestors lived and evolved. This is not to suggest that evaluative judgment 
played no role in cooperative activity among early humans, or even that evaluative judgment did 
not come under selective pressures at some point in human evolutionary history; rather, it is to 
point out that there is little evidence that evaluative judgment evolved just to call for similar 
behaviors as fixed evaluative tendencies, or specifically to remedy deficiencies of evaluative 
tendencies within cooperative contexts.3 
 
ALA is untenable on empirical grounds 
At the intuitive level, then, ALA is a rather tenuous explanation of basic evaluative 
judgments. But we should not rely solely on our intuitions when assessing the plausibility of an 
evolutionary account. Recall that ALA’s central claim is that basic evaluative judgments are 
“deeply analogous” to hard-wired mechanisms in other species. If this claim were true, we would 
expect the capacity to make evaluative judgments to be relatively inflexible and cue-bound, or at 
the very least exhibit these profiles in the early stages of moral and social cognitive development. 
But the immense body of empirical research on human social learning and moral development 
indicates that something quite the contrary is the case: evaluative judgment exhibits a high 
                                                
3 Joyce (2006), handling a similar objection from Lahti (2003), suggests it makes little sense to ask why selection 
didn’t simply strengthen existing motivational tendencies to get us to act in certain ways. He asserts that natural 
selection did design us to act this way, and evaluative judgment was a way to do it. Joyce frames the question as 
being about natural selection choosing between two options, namely a desire for a given behavior or a mechanism 
that facilitates the desire. But the question is about the reliability of evolved evaluative tendencies for cooperative 
behavior already in place among our ancestors prior to the evolution of evaluative judgment. 
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degree of flexibility and sensitivity to variation in social learning environments. Here I shall 
focus on one area of this literature, namely developmental studies of moral judgment and social 
behavior in humans. Consideration of these studies will suffice to show that ALA’s account of 
basic evaluative judgments is both descriptively inadequate and implausible on empirical 
grounds. 
If ALA is correct in asserting that basic evaluative judgments are analogous to other 
‘hard-wired’ traits, we should expect developmental research to show that the emergence of 
evaluative judgment in young children either follows a simple, unitary pathway toward 
correspondence with basic evaluative tendencies, or that evaluative judgment is relatively 
inflexible at its developmental origin (prior to familial and social influence on norm acceptance). 
However, several developmental studies have found that neither scenario is the case.  
Longitudinal and concurrent studies of moral development in children show that 
predispositions to experience moral emotions, such as empathy and guilt, and the process and 
degree of internalization of social and cultural norms is determined in large part by the character 
of early parental interaction and other relationships of care. For example, through a series of 
studies Kochanska and colleagues found that children’s early acceptance and compliance with 
familial norms in the early stages of moral development correlates with the degree of maternal 
affective responsive to child need and distress, and the degree of cooperation within parent-child 
interactions such as play, eating meals, and household chores (Kochanska 2002; Kochanska & 
Murray 2000; Kochanska et al. 2005). These studies suggest that the development of a moral 
sense in children and of patterns of evaluative judgments across a range of social situations 
varies significantly according to the degree of mutual responsiveness present in the parent-child 
dyad. 
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Similar findings emerged from Deborah Laible and colleagues’ research on the emotional 
mediation of moral judgment and social behavior. Children who form secure attachment 
relationships with parents and peers, and frequently conduct emotion-laden conversations about 
their previous behavior and actions within these relationships, exhibit an increased capacity to 
cultivate emotional understanding and internalize social and moral norms (Laible 2007; Laible & 
Thompson 2000). Laible and colleagues suggest that patterns of evaluative judgment among 
children and adolescents are sensitive to familial and social contexts, and are more directly 
influenced by the development of dispositions to experience social emotions like guilt and 
empathy. Their work shows not only that evaluative judgment is malleable in young children, but 
also that development of emotional dispositions, which might be counted as evaluative 
tendencies, exhibit wide variability depending on the kind and quality of children’s attachment 
relationships. Additional studies of children’s ability to identify and respond to others’ harming 
and helping behavior suggest that children as young as two years of age are capable of 
rudimentary moral judgments that are dissociated from other evolved dispositions and capacities 
that underwrite social behavior, including elicitors of stress and perceptions of distress in others 
(Hamlin 2012; Vaish et al. 2009; 2010).  
Cross-cultural research on how children and adults weigh particular moral duties, and the 
degree to which they privilege interpersonal or impersonal values within practical deliberation, 
shows that patterns of evaluative judgment in both groups vary across cultural contexts. For 
example, Miller and Bersoff (1992) and Miller (1994) found that this variation is not associated 
with differences among subjects’ perceptions of the seriousness of certain moral contexts (e.g., 
breaches of moral norms), nor does it vary along the lines of a putative distinction between 
conventional and moral norms. The cultural patterning of evaluative judgment suggests a much 
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looser association between what might be universal or widespread evaluative tendencies and the 
kinds of evaluative judgments humans make than that which ALA supposes, with cultural 
influence often playing a significant role in shaping the content of these judgments. 
Developmental and cross-cultural research on moral development in children, therefore, 
undermines ALA’s claim that basic evaluative judgments are analogous to evolved, hard-wired 
mechanisms in other species. Far from aligning with phylogenetically widespread evaluative 
tendencies, patterns of human evaluative judgments show significant variation according to the 
familial and cultural contexts in which moral development occurs. This includes patterns of 
evaluative judgments that Street alleges are explainable by reference to kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism, such as evaluative judgments about appropriate responses to the needs of 
close relatives, the reciprocation of helpful behaviors performed by non-kin, and navigating 
intergroup relations (Bartels 2008; Heisphetz & Young 2014; Thompson et al. 2003). During 
moral and social development, the emerging capacity in children to form basic evaluative 
judgments does not inflexibly correspond to fixed emotional or behavioral tendencies, but 
instead exhibits a keen sensitivity to variations within and across social contexts. This is not to 
suggest that evolved evaluative tendencies play no role in shaping patterns of these judgments, 
but it is to suggest that the determination of these patterns is multifactorial, jointly formed by a 
range of ontogenetic inputs as well as evolutionary factors.  
 
Taking stock 
 ALA, thus, is fraught with theoretical difficulties, and its claim that basic evaluative 
judgments are analogous to hard-wired evolutionary traits stands at odds with current empirical 
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research on moral and social development in humans.4 Furthermore, it leaves us without a clear 
picture of the link between basic evaluative judgments and the ancestral environment in which 
they evolved. In asserting that basic evaluative judgments are adaptations without also providing 
a clear account of their evolutionary origin, ALA does little to explain the widespread patterns of 
evaluative judgments among humans, and so fails to satisfy two of the three desiderata Street 
privileges, namely illumination of the explanandum in question and clarity with respect to why 
these judgments were adaptive and favored by selection.  
While the foregoing considerations reveal the inadequacies of ALA, it still remains to be 
seen whether normative realism is compatible with the EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS. To show 
that they are, indeed, compatible, I turn now to sketching an alternative evolutionary perspective 
on basic evaluative judgments, which the normative realist can adopt. 
 
 
An evolutionary alternative for the normative realist 
 
ALA and TA are adaptationist approaches to the explanation of basic evaluative 
judgments. For such adaptationist explanations to work, they must account for the evolutionary 
emergence and maintenance of the capacity for evaluatively judging and not simply for the more 
phylogenetically widespread evaluative tendencies that may influence the content of some of our 
basic evaluative judgments. If evaluative judgment is more phylogenetically recent than these 
                                                
4 ALA appears also to stand in tension with dual process models of social cognition (DPMs), which are prevalent in 
the social and cognitive psychology literature. DPMs generally distinguish between two levels of cognitive 
processes that jointly underwrite human behavioral, social, and moral judgments. On one level are cognitive 
processes marked by speed, unregulated automaticity, and efficiency with respect to the formation of mental 
representations of, and behavioral motivation in response to, environmental stimuli. Commonly grouped among 
these processes, which are often dubbed ‘System 1’ (S1) processes, are emotional regulation, attention biases, 
behavior contagion, and threat and reward sensitivity. According to DPMs, S1 processes are contrasted with 
‘System 2’ (S2) processes, which are slow, reflective, and selective with respect to execution. DPM theorists often 
take S1 processes to be evolutionary old and phylogenetically widespread, and S2 processes to be evolutionarily 
new and perhaps unique to the hominin lineage. While Street’s characterization of evaluative tendencies would 
appear to place them at the S1 level, her view of basic evaluative judgments as reflective endorsements of such 
tendencies would seem to place them at the S2 level. If that is correct, then basic evaluative judgments would hardly 
resemble hard-wired processes, but instead would look more like regulated, selective S2 interventions. 
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evaluative tendencies, the latter of which have an independent evolutionary history tied to the 
behaviors they promoted, then we must explain why the additional capacity for evaluative 
judgment came under selective pressure. Given the challenges ALA and TA face, perhaps it is 
worth considering how shifting from an adaptationist perspective on evaluative judgment to an 
evolutionary byproduct perspective might fare.  
 
A byproduct framework for evaluative judgment 
On a byproduct account, the capacity for evaluative judgment is an effect of cognitive 
mechanisms that were fashioned by natural selection. By ‘effect’ I mean a trait that was not 
targeted by natural selection to serve its current role.5 A byproduct view of evaluative judgment 
holds that the underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for evaluative judgment were the 
target of selective pressures on account of their governing other adaptive processes and 
behaviors in our evolutionary past. A byproduct perspective thus does not join ALA and TA in 
assuming that evaluative judgment is an adaptation, though it does offer an evolutionary 
perspective on the trait in question by pointing to the enabling adaptations that incidentally gave 
rise to it.6 
Before proceeding to sketch the framework of a byproduct perspective on evaluative 
judgment, let me forestall a potential worry that adopting this framework would simply be an ad 
                                                
5 It is worth noting that the claim that a given trait is not an adaptation does not entail the view that the trait was 
never adaptive. While an effect was not the target of selective pressures, it could have been co-opted after its 
emergence to play some adaptive role at a later evolutionary stage of a population (Gould & Vrba 1982; Gould 
1991). 
 
6 Street briefly considers the byproduct option before summarily dismissing it as implausible: “It is completely 
implausible, for instance, to suggest that the human eye in its present developed form emerged as the purely 
incidental byproduct of selection for some other, unrelated capacity. I suggest that it is no more implausible to claim 
that the sophisticated ability to grasp independent evaluative truths emerged as such a byproduct” (2006, 143). 
Street’s dismissal not only ignores byproduct accounts of many sophisticated cognitive traits (e.g., Atran 2010; De 
Smedt & De Cruz 2010; Piattelli-Palmarini 1989), but also plainly begs the question against a byproduct account of 
evaluative judgment by comparing the evolutionary processes that brought about the capacity for evaluative 
judgment to those that brought about the human eye. 
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hoc maneuver designed to avoid the problems adaptationist explanations pose for normative 
realism. Byproduct accounts of evaluative judgment are not novel in the philosophical literature, 
and they have enjoyed endorsement by philosophers who do not espouse the kinds of normative 
realism on which evolutionary debunking arguments focus (e.g., Nichols 2002; Prinz 2009; 
Ayala 2009). These philosophers find byproduct accounts of evaluative judgment to be plausible 
apart from any specific metaethical commitment.  
Some philosophers who are sympathetic to normative realism have recently expressed 
support for a byproduct account. For example, De Lazari-Radek & Singer suggest that once 
selection favored a general capacity for reasoning within our ancestral populations, humans may 
have become “unable to avoid recognizing and discovering some truths that do not aid our 
survival,” including normative truths (2014, 182). In a similar vein, FitzPatrick contends that if 
selection has “given us general cognitive capacities that we can now develop and deploy in rich 
cultural contexts, with training in relevant methodologies,” then an adaptationist account along 
the lines of TA may not be required to show that normative realism is compatible with 
evolutionary theory (2015, 887).  
A byproduct perspective, thus, seems compatible with an array of metaethical 
commitments. It is one thing to commend or endorse a byproduct account, however, and quite 
another to show both that there are adequate reasons for preferring it to an adaptationist 
alternative and that a realist’s byproduct account could meet Street’s scientific challenge. Very 
little work has been done in this regard, and in the remainder of this section and the next, I begin 
that task. 
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The grasping capacity view 
Because an evolutionary perspective presupposes the presence of the focal trait, the kind 
of byproduct account that the normative realist utilizes would be shaped having in mind 
realism’s commitment to irreducible normative truths. As a rough and very broad construal of 
this perspective—congenial to both non-reductive naturalist and non-naturalist metaethical 
positions—I propose the following: 
GRASPING CAPACITY VIEW (GCV): Human beings grasp stance-independent normative 
truths because the cognitive mechanisms necessary to do so were adaptive.  
 
According to GCV, humans evolved the necessary cognitive capacities to grasp normative truths, 
but, as a byproduct account, GCV maintains (in contrast to TA) that grasping normative truths 
and making true evaluative judgments are not the functions of these capacities. Rather, 
evaluative judgment is taken to be an incidental effect of other enabling faculties that were 
selected to perform specific biological functions that contributed to the survival and reproductive 
success of our ancestors.  
Now, a full-scale defense of GCV would require evolutionary explanations and 
descriptively adequate accounts of the enabling cognitive capacities—mammoth undertakings 
well beyond the scope of this paper. While my intention here is only to sketch the contours of 
GCV and address the question of whether the realist can meet Street’s scientific challenge by 
adopting it, a few words should still be said about how these enabling capacities might lead to 
the discovery of irreducible normative truths. For GCV to be plausible, the cognitive faculties 
responsible for evaluative judgment must be such that they do not evidently require an additional 
evolutionary explanation to account for the capacity to make evaluative judgments, some of 
which turn out to be true. So we might first ask whether we have reason to think that the 
cognitive faculties that likely were shaped by natural selection for functions other than making 
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evaluative judgments would be sensitive to the normative truths the realist posits. Here, 
nonnaturalism tends to engender greater controversy than non-reductive naturalism, so I will 
focus for the moment on the former.  
It might be tempting to think that, if there are nonnatural normative truths, a special 
cognitive faculty is necessary to grasp them. But the ontological commitments of nonnaturalism 
do not entail that a sui generis faculty must be available for grasping them. Indeed, the most 
plausible versions of nonnaturalism abstain from positing a unique or obscure cognitive faculty 
that enables us to grasp normative facts (e.g., Stratton-Lake 2002; Roeser 2011). These versions 
of nonnaturalism require no more than a faculty capable of grasping the conceptual truth of 
certain normative propositions—a faculty that need be no more exotic than that which grasps the 
truth of general and abstract propositions, such as those of mathematics and logic. So the 
pertinent question is whether the nonnaturalist could make good on the claim that the cognitive 
faculties that underlie evaluative judgment have plausible selectionist stories.  
Which cognitive capacities would the nonnaturalist claim enable the grasping of 
normative truths? Presumably, these would include the ability to discriminate, abstract from, and 
classify persons, events, and actions, the ability to anticipate and predict consequences of one’s 
own behavior and that of one’s conspecifics, and the capacity for belief formation. Two recent 
theories of the evolutionary development of these faculties in humans are especially helpful in 
thinking about the possible evolutionary pathways to evaluative judgment. Godfrey-Smith 
(1996) argues that the evolutionary function of complex cognitive faculties is to enable an 
organism to deal with complex environments. Cognitive complexity enables an organism to 
adjust and react adaptively to ecological variability. Sterelny (2003) contends that populations 
within heterogeneous and informationally opaque environments would undergo selective 
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pressure for capacities to decouple representational states from the cue-bound behavior 
characteristic of simpler detection systems suitable for transparent environments. The demand 
for complex representational systems would be especially keen in the context of complex 
primate social environments (Kummer et al. 1997; Sterelny 2012). Whether one focuses on 
environmental complexity or informational opacity, the enabling conditions of evaluative 
judgment may be explainable in terms of the cognitive demands of primate social life and the 
eventual evolution of cultural scaffolding for intergenerational information transmission. In order 
to handle and adaptively utilize the informational load of increasingly complex social exchange 
and cross-generational cultural learning, humans evolved capacities to reason modally, logically, 
and mathematically. These capacities may have enabled not only the grasping of the conceptual 
truths of mathematical and logical propositions, but also conceptual truths of normative 
propositions.  
For this to be a plausible view, of course, the way in which humans grasp the conceptual 
truth of normative propositions must be similar to that by which they grasp the conceptual truth 
of abstract propositions in domains where judgments were important to production of adaptive 
behavior. It seems that only then could the realist plausibly maintain that evolution shaped in 
humans capacities sensitive to irreducibly normative truths. This consideration might force us to 
acknowledge a dividing line between two families of nonnaturalism with respect to which 
versions of nonnaturalism are plausible from an evolutionary standpoint. According to ‘relaxed’ 
views of nonnaturalism, a commitment to irreducible normative truths does not entail a particular 
ontological commitment to a realm of nonnatural properties within the world.7 The way in which 
we grasp conceptual normative truths is the same as, or quite similar to, the way in which we 
grasp the conceptual truths of propositions of the formal sciences. Relaxed versions of 
                                                
7 I take the label and category of ‘relaxed realist’ from Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014) and McGrath (2014). 
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nonnaturalism can be contrasted with their “robust” counterparts, which do posit an independent 
realm of irreducibly normative facts that serve as the truthmakers of (some) normative 
propositions (e.g., Enoch 2011; FitzPatrick 2008). GCV might accommodate either family of 
nonnaturalism, though it is clear that robust versions of nonnaturalism require a considerably 
more complex evolutionary story than I have provided, one that also explains how human 
cognitive faculties developed a sensitivity to these independent, nonnatural facts. This may 
suggest that relaxed versions of nonnaturalism enjoy a higher degree of plausibility than robust 
versions from an evolutionary perspective, since the former do not require cognitive sensitivity 
to sui generis features of the world. At any rate, my purpose here is not to vindicate a particular 
brand of normative realism, but only to show that at least some versions of nonnaturalism—as 
well as nonreductive naturalism—fit within an evolutionary byproduct framework. 
Another important feature of GCV to note is its ability to accommodate the evidence that 
the content of some of our basic evaluative judgments is susceptible to evolutionary explanation. 
However, because GCV denies that selection pressures pushed our ancestors to make these 
judgments, thereby fixing to a large degree patterns of basic evaluative judgment, it leaves room 
for non-selectionist explanations for the content of other basic evaluative judgments that do not 
have a straightforward evolutionary explanation. For example, consider the basic evaluative 
judgment that one has a duty of beneficence that extends beyond kith and kin, a notoriously 
thorny case for individual-level adaptationist stories. A variety of selectionist accounts for 
putative duties, such as the duty of beneficence, have been offered by philosophers,8 yet these 
                                                
8 Joyce (2006) and James (2011) appeal to kin selection to explain initial tendencies in early humans for directing 
helping behaviors toward non-kin, and they suggest that such tendencies underlie further evolved dispositions for 
cooperation. James suggests that there would not have been selective pressures for fine-grained kin-detection 
devices, since early humans would have lived in tightly knit communities consisting largely of individuals related to 
various degrees, who consequently would have been disposed to cooperate to some degree. Following Joyce, James 
utilizes this kin selection hypothesis to work up to a more complex explanation of a psychological tendency in early 
humans to cooperate with those living in close proximity, with ‘false positives’ sometimes prompting the 
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accounts have been met with skeptical responses by biologists and philosophers who doubt the 
accounts are sufficiently powerful to explain basic evaluative judgments about duties that extend 
beyond kin and close associates (e.g., Rosenberg 1990, Silk 2003, Silk and Boyd 2010, Laland 
and Brown 2011). Here, the realist claims to have something to offer: we tend to make the 
judgment that we have a duty of beneficence even to strangers because we have grasped some 
truth about the rightness of beneficent actions. Whether this answer is provided in nonnaturalist 
or nonreductive naturalist terms, the realist can utilize GCV to help explain why there are some 
basic evaluative judgments whose contents are not easily accounted for by selectionist models. 
Moreover, the realist can still accept that the content of other basic evaluative judgments, such as 
‘that Φ-ing would benefit a close relative is a reason to Φ’, can largely be explained in non-
realist, evolutionary terms; the realist need not hold that all basic evaluative judgments answer to 
an independent normative reality, but only that some such judgments are. Thus, a proponent of 
GCV can consistently affirm the EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS by adopting an evolutionary 
perspective on the origin of the underlying mechanisms of the capacity for evaluative judgment 
and, optionally, a selectionist picture of the content of some of our basic evaluative judgments. 
Now, the foregoing sketch of GCV does not approach a substantive evolutionary account 
of evaluative judgment, nor does it venture to address longstanding epistemic, metaphysical, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
cooperation with non-kin. For their accounts to work, a surprising number of major trait transitions would have had 
to occur in early hominid populations within an improbably short evolutionary timeframe after the spit from their 
common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos: (i) loss of olfactory sensitivity to close kin; (ii) loss of capacity 
for finer-grained kin detection based on phenotypic clues, a trait that extant primates still possess and, presumably, 
so too did the last common ancestor before the Pan-Homo split (Parr & De Waal 1999; Silk 2005; Widdig 2007; 
Chapais 2010); (iii) a significant change in group composition from primate social groups composed of kin and non-
kin to social groups consisting mostly of kin; (iv) despite the evolution of stable breeding bonds and increased 
biparental care of offspring in early hominid communities, selection would have elaborated the psychological 
tendencies put in place by kin selection to gradually intensify novel cooperative dispositions toward non-kin. 
Additionally, according to James, all these rapid transitions likely would have occurred in early humans before the 
evolution of language. Now, this is not to say that the stories James and Joyce tell are false, but it is to say that their 
stories appear much less plausible when we take into account probable phylogenetic constraints on kin bias among 
early hominids and the very short evolutionary time scale on which the trait transitions required for James’s and 
Joyce’s stories to work—many of which are phylogenetically novel—would have had to occur. 
 21 
motivational debates over the philosophical commitments of normative realism. What is 
important for my purposes here is the plausibility of GCV’s main contentions that evaluative 
judgment is enabled by other cognitive adaptations, and that these cognitive adaptations are 
sensitive to the kinds of normative truths that nonreductive naturalist and nonnaturalist realisms 
posit. Assuming that enough has been said to motivate GCV, we can turn to the question of why 
a byproduct like GCV would be preferable to an adaptationist account of evaluative judgment. 
 
Deciding between adaptationist and byproduct accounts 
As I alluded to above, a likely concern about GCV is that there needs to be some 
evidence that favors choosing it over its adaptationist rivals. What sort of evidence could 
determine whether a given trait is a byproduct or an adaptation? In their classic article on 
exaptation, Gould and Vrba (1981) note that we should, in principle, be able to discriminate 
between morphological byproducts and adaptations. In the case of a bird’s feathers, for example, 
Gould and Vrba suggest that the common exaptationist view could be confirmed by the 
discovery of fossils from a small running dinosaur that had feathers. However, unlike many 
morphological traits, cognitive faculties and behaviors do not leave behind fossils for the 
convenience of such confirmation. 
 In the absence of physical evidence, some scientists and philosophers have proposed 
other ways for determining whether a trait is an adaptation. Lloyd (2005), for example, suggests 
the following criteria for determining that a trait is an adaptation: (1) variations of the trait have a 
genetic basis; (2) the fitness benefits the trait confers can be shown; and (3) we have a clear 
understanding of the link between the trait and how it helped facilitate evolutionary success. 
Additionally, Pinker and Bloom (1992) claim (4) a trait’s being evidently of complex design is 
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evidence in favor of taking that trait to be an adaptation. It is not clear, however, whether these 
criteria will help to decide the matter with respect to evaluative judgment. Criteria (2) and (3) fail 
to help in the case of cognitive and behavioral traits since selection pressures on behavioral traits 
in the past cannot be directly measured in our present environment; the ecological and social 
conditions in which evaluative judgment evolved have long since passed. With respect to 
criterion (1), we should acknowledge that, even though evaluative judgment appears to be a fixed 
trait in humans, there is variation across individuals with respect to both the ability to reason 
evaluatively and responsiveness to ethically salient features of actions, events, and persons. But 
whether this phenotypic variability expresses genetic variation across individuals (and not 
predominantly ontogenetic variation) remains opaque. Thus, it is not clear presently whether (1) 
is satisfied. Finally, while evaluative judgment is a relatively complex capacity in humans, 
criterion (4) is too permissive to rule out all byproduct traits, since a high degree of complexity is 
not sufficient for determining whether a cognitive or behavioral trait is an adaptation (Burian 
1983).  
Since it is not clear that the common criteria used for determining which traits are 
adaptations are satisfied, we may have to rely on a methodological point. In contrast to advocates 
of adaptationist approaches to evaluative judgment, the proponent of GCV contends that it is not 
necessary to posit an additional cognitive faculty in humans that was selected specifically to 
make evaluative judgments. While a workable byproduct perspective like GCV does not entail 
that an adaptationist account must be false, it does shift an argumentative burden to those who 
wish to provide one for evaluative judgment.9  
                                                
9 Joyce aims to provide reasons in favor of taking moral judgment to be an adaptation as opposed to an evolutionary 
byproduct (2006, 133-39), but his discussion slips from the question of whether moral judgment is an evolutionary 
adaptation to whether moral judgment is innate. That a trait is innate does not entail that it is an adaptation. 
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 With these various concerns diffused, we should consider another challenge to versions 
of normative realism that posit independent normative truths or facts. Suppose the normative 
antirealist were to retool an account like ALA and tender a plausible evolutionary explanation for 
widespread patterns of basic evaluative judgments. Since the antirealist’s explanation would 
make no reference to independent normative facts, would it not be a better scientific theory, 
other things equal, in virtue of being more ontologically parsimonious than any realist rival 
theory? I now turn to addressing this question. 
 
 A parsimony problem? 
While ontological parsimony—in conjunction with other desiderata—is valued across 
many of the natural sciences, determining which virtues should be exemplified in a particular 
scientific theory depends largely on the aims of the particular field of science in which the theory 
is constructed, as well as on the specific features of the problems the theory addresses (Kellert et 
al. 2006). Within the biological sciences, the importance of parsimony varies according to 
method and context; for example, it tends to be counted among the desiderata of phylogenetic 
construction, though not always the most important of virtues (Sober 1990). In other areas of 
biology, such as biogeography, it serves at most as a sort of “tie-breaker” between rival theories 
(Baker 2007). What is of concern here is determining what role ontological parsimony might 
play in choosing among rival evolutionary explanations of evaluative judgment. This requires a 
consideration of how biologists structure explanations of behavioral traits. 
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Four levels of analysis 
The standard structure of an evolutionary-behavioral explanation of a trait comprises four 
complementary, non-overlapping explanations, or levels of analysis (Tinbergen 1963; Sherman 
1988; Bateson & Gluckman 2011; MacDougall-Shackleton 2011). Each of the four explanatory 
levels offers a solution to a distinct problem the biologist encounters in the study of a particular 
behavioral trait: (a) the phylogeny of the trait, (b) the functional consequence of the trait, (c) the 
ontogenetic processes through which the trait develops in the individual, and (d) the trait’s 
underlying enabling mechanisms. These four solutions combine to form a complex, integrated 
biological explanation of the behavioral trait being investigated. Solutions to (a) and (b) are 
ultimate explanations, answering questions about why an organism possesses the trait, but (a) and 
(b) are discrete explanations, as the former provides the evolutionary history of the behavioral 
trait across species, while the latter indicates the function of the trait within a certain population. 
Solutions to (c) and (d) are proximate explanations; they answer questions about how the trait 
develops and operates in an individual. But (c) and (d) are distinct from one another, as the 
former addresses the question of how the trait develops during the lifecycle of the individual, and 
(d) addresses the question of how the trait operates. A comprehensive biological explanation of a 
behavioral trait, therefore, comprises four accounts, each stationed at a distinct explanatory level 
and each irreducible to the others. Another important feature of level analysis should be noted: 
competition among theories does not take place across the explanatory levels, but only within 
each level (Sherman 1988; MacDougall-Shackleton 2011). Each level of analysis is 
distinguished according to a unique explanandum, so none of the resulting explanantia making 
up the compound explanation is a rival to the others. 
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Normative realism and level analysis 
Returning now to the evolutionary explanation of evaluative judgment, if there were to be 
a competition between two rival explanations on, say, the grounds of ontological parsimony, it 
would have to occur at one or another explanatory level. This means that Street’s point about 
ontological parsimony is relevant only if normative facts play a role for the realist at the same 
explanatory level as her account of evaluative judgment. But, if the realist adopts GCV, they 
would not. ALA is a functional consequence explanation; it seeks to answer an ultimate question 
about why evaluative judgments were selected for. GCV, the byproduct account I proposed, can 
also be characterized as a functional consequence account, though the functions it targets would 
be those for which the cognitive mechanisms underlying the capacity for evaluative judgment 
were selected. This means that at the level of functional consequences, normative facts do not 
factor into the picture for ALA and GCV. To see that this is the case, consider that GCV is 
committed to the view that grasping normative facts is not a biological function of these 
underlying mechanisms, but a byproduct of those mechanisms. Were we to exclude from the 
story any reference to a capacity for grasping normative facts, no substantive change to GCV 
would result. Thus, there does not seem to be any scenario in which ontological parsimony 
would directly impact our choice between ALA and GCV at the level of functional consequence. 
Still, even if the realist adopts GCV, normative facts surely must figure into his/her 
biological account of true evaluative judgment, but if not at the functional consequence level, 
then where? Table 1 presents a simplified biological explanation of evaluative judgment the 
realist might offer.  
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TABLE 1  
Ultimate Cause Proximate Cause 
a. Evolutionary history of enabling mechanisms 
of grasping truth 
 
c. Normative facts + other genetic and 
environmental factors 
b. Function(s) of enabling mechanisms of 
grasping truth 
d. Enabling mechanisms of grasping normative 
facts and evaluative judgment making 
 
As the table indicates, it makes most sense to place normative facts at the level of ontogeny. 
There are two reasons for this. First, independent normative facts are not elements for the 
construction of the phylogeny of the underlying components of evaluative judgment, particularly 
because on GCV, the capacity to grasp these facts did not come under selective pressure. And 
since the posited normative facts do not figure directly in a functional consequence account, the 
realist will not locate them at either of the two ultimate explanatory levels. This means, they 
should be located at one of the two proximate explanatory levels. Second, robust and non-
reductive realists take normative facts to be independent of any attitude or stance. Normative 
facts, on their view, are grasped or tracked as features of our world independent of our evaluative 
attitudes, and realists understand normative facts as one factor in making evaluative judgments 
that are true. Of course, other relevant environmental factors, such as moral education, may have 
to be incorporated into the ontogenetic account of the development of evaluative judgment 
making and truth grasping in humans, but what is important for my purposes is that normative 
facts would not figure into either ultimate level of explanation, but at the ontogenetic level. This 
means that ALA, were it sound, would not enjoy prima facie superiority to GCV at the functional 
consequence level on grounds of ontological parsimony, because the latter does not require direct 
reference to independent normative facts. Any concern over ontological parsimony would take 
place at the level of ontogenetic factors affecting the making of evaluative judgment. To think 
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that ontological parsimony matters in a direct comparison of GCV and ALA would be to blur the 
distinction between ultimate, functional explanation and proximate, ontogenetic explanation.  
So how then does the realist justify the incorporation of irreducible normative truths into 
an ontogenetic explanation of our basic evaluative judgments? This is precisely where the 
antirealist should press his/her concern about ontological parsimony. Just as we would expect a 
defense of the particular details incorporated at any of the other explanatory levels, we should 
demand the normative realist show that the best ontogenetic explanation of evaluative judgment 
commits us to positing independent normative facts. But this matter will not be settled by an 
account of the phylogeny or functional consequence of evaluative judgment. Rather, that debate 
will center on whether we should countenance such facts at all, taking place on the usual 
epistemological, semantic, and ontological battlegrounds it traditionally has.  
There are two main conclusions I wish to draw from this consideration of the levels of 
analysis. First, the worry that the normative realist’s functional consequence account of 
evaluative judgment would violate a principle of ontological parsimony dissipates should the 
realist adopt GCV. In this case, the realist’s functional consequence explanation need not involve 
direct reference to normative facts. Second, from a strictly evolutionary perspective, the question 
of whether there are independent normative facts appears underdetermined. Phylogenetic and 
functional consequence accounts of evaluative judgment do not point us toward or away from 
normative realism, and they offer little direct assistance in resolving this metaethical debate. By 
adopting GCV, therefore, the normative realist is not at a prima facie disadvantage to the 
antirealist from an evolutionary point of view. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
The strategy I provide in this paper is only one that the normative realist might deploy in 
countering DD. For Street’s scientific challenge to pose a serious threat to normative realism, her 
Adaptive Link Account must be superior by the standards of scientific theory to any evolutionary 
explanation the realist can offer. But we have seen that Street’s account faces serious theoretical 
difficulties and clearly falls short of the scientific standards to which she appeals in criticizing 
normative realism. We have also seen that there is a plausible evolutionary perspective on 
evaluative judgment that the realist can adopt, namely GCV. Finally, attention to the standard 
framework biologists utilize in explaining behavioral traits has shown that normative realism 
need not be at a prima facie theoretical disadvantage on grounds of ontological parsimony within 
the evolutionary debate, should the antirealist tender a plausible evolutionary account of 
evaluative judgment.  
Normative realism continues to face serious philosophical challenges, and this paper does 
not provide anything approaching a full defense of the view. However, enough has been said to 
show that Street’s scientific challenge can be met by the realist. Normative realism, therefore, is 
not faced with a peculiarly Darwinian dilemma. 
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